Contests are a common method to describe the distribution of many di¤erent types of rents. Yet in many of these situations the utilisation of the prize plays an important role in determining agents'payo¤s and incentives. In this paper, we investigate the incentives to expend e¤ort for a prize that produces consumption externalities and consider alternative regulatory policies. We …nd relatively more global consumption externalities will increase (decrease) rent seeking when consumption externalities are negative (positive). We show how introducing Pigouvian taxation (possibly with revenue transfer) and Coasean bargaining alters equilibrium e¤ort and payo¤s. Pigouvian taxation tends to reduce both e¤ort and payo¤s whereas this is not always the case for Coasean bargaining. In the presence of suf-…ciently large consumption externalities, establishing Pigouvian taxation coupled with some element of lump-sum transfer may reduce costly rent seeking e¤ort and improve the welfare of some agents compared to other approaches. (I. A. MacKenzie); , Tel: +41 44 632 04 68; Fax: +41 44 632 13 62.
Introduction
Conventional rent-seeking frameworks allow analysis of many political and economic interactions where agents expend e¤ort to win a prize which produces private bene…ts, such as litigation, political campaigns, sport events, R&D patents, con ‡icts and natural resource rights allocation (Congleton et al. 2008b; Konrad, 2009 ). However, in many cases, the consumption or utilisation of the rent plays a fundamental role in determining agents' utilities and incentives to invest in e¤ort. In particular, consumption of the rent often produces externalities.
It has long been known how to deal with externalities, namely the implementation of Pigouvian taxation or Coasean bargaining, yet it is currently unclear how these mechanisms perform in rent seeking contests under the presence of externalities. For example, would producers lobby more to obtain a share of carbon dioxide emission rights than to obtain a share of radioactive waste rights? Do pollution taxes or tradable pollution permit markets perform better in controlling rent dissipation? It turns out, the extent of rent seeking depends on whether consumption produces positive or negative externalities and the extent of the 'globalness'. Pigouvian taxation and Coasean bargaining produce very di¤erent e¤ects on rent seeking strategies and payo¤s which depend, in part, on the level of marginal externalities. A potentially successful solution is to establish Pigouvian taxation coupled with some element of lump-sum transfer which may reduce costly rent seeking e¤ort and improve the welfare of some agents compared to other approaches.
In conventional contests, negative externalities exist as an agent's probability of obtaining a prize declines with an increase in rivals'e¤ort (see, for example, Hillman and Riley, (1989) , Nitzan (1994) , Congleton et al. (2008a) and Konrad (2009) ). Yet, other externalities exist in contests, such as spillovers from patent races, damage to infrastructure due to military con ‡icts and so on (Congleton, 1989; Chung, 1996; Lee and Kang, 1998; Sha¤er, 2006) . In order to analyse externalities in contests, it has generally been assumed that the level of aggregate e¤ort alters the size of the contestable rent. For example, one can consider labour tournaments where the increase in (productive) e¤ort by workers results in a larger surplus for all in the organisation. Yet restricting analysis to contests that only produce externalities as a result of an endogenously determined rent (i.e. aggregate e¤orts in ‡uencing the rent) may not help to explain all types of externalities present in contests. Importantly, it is possible that while a contest prize remains …xed, agents'consumption of the prize produces additional bene…ts (costs)-consumption externalities. For example, the capturing of natural resource rights (such as coal, gas, oil, …sheries and forestry), may all produce externalities independent of aggregate e¤ort. Our prize is a private, excludable and rivalrous rent where the consumption of the prize produces e¤ects in the form of both private bene…ts (damages) and 'global'externalities (for rivals). 1 An important distinction in our model is that the act of consumption produces transferable externalities (Bird, 1987) . 2 This means that an agent can transfer (a portion of) externalities to rival agents in the contest by consuming more of the rent.
The work most relevant to our paper is by Shogren and Crocker (1991) , who consider a contest with transferable externalities among agents. 3 They show when agents have the ability to invest in protection against environmental externalities that over-protection may occur when externalities are transferable among agents. It is possible that the notion of transferability externalities can be discussed in a much broader context. In our paper, consumption externalities are similar to transferable externalities in that, a change in the distribution of consumption will alter the levels of externalities each agent experiences.
Yet there a number of subtle di¤erences. First, our externalities are consumption-based, therefore it is as a consequence of consumption that externalities occur and not ad hoc externalities in which agents have to protect against. This means that the prize in our contest is a rivalrous and excludable rent. Second, consumption externalities have an additional e¤ect based on private consumption. Therefore, an agent that consumes the 1 Contests have also been considered where the prize is a public good (Katz et al., 1990; Ursprung, 1990; Baik, 1993; Gradstein, 1993; Linster, 1993; Riaz et al., 1995; Baik, 2008; Epstein and Mealem, 2009) . The conventional approach is to allow individuals (within a group) to independently invest in e¤ort where the group with the largest aggregate e¤ort wins the group-speci…c public good. In general, it has been found that, within the winning group, individuals with higher valuations invest more e¤ort whereas lower valuing individuals tend to free ride.
2 Unrelated to the context of consumption externalities, Appelbaum and Katz (1986) were the …rst to formally consider the e¤ort of agents when the bene…ts and costs of a rent are transferred among agents. 3 The general theme of externalities can also been considered in a number of contexts, such as contest where agents can be altruists or envious (e.g. Konrad, 2004) and multiple agents where the losers are not indi¤erent about who wins the rent (e.g. Linster, 1993) . rent will produce global externalities but also experience a private consumption e¤ect. We provide further insight for the results of Shogren and Crocker (1991) and show this is a special case of our framework, where over-e¤ort occurs as a result of relatively large global externalities compared to the private consumption e¤ect. We then compare e¤ort levels and payo¤s in the contest in which Pigouvian and Coasean solutions are implemented.
In this paper, we allow agents to invest in e¤ort to win a share of a rivalrous and excludable resource which is then fully utilised. Firstly, an agent's consumption of the rent may provide additional private e¤ects. Second, agents'consumption of the rent may produce externalities for rivals. The consumption externalities e¤ect is in addition to those experienced in conventional contests. We …nd that in the equilibrium of the contest, agents' optimal actions decrease in the index of relative globalness, so that an increase in relative globalness will increase (decrease) actions for negative (positive) externalities. When the regulator has the ability to introduce Pigouvian taxation or allow ex post Coasean bargaining, we …nd that taxation reduces e¤ort whereas this does not always happen for Coasean bargaining. When Coasean bargaining is introduced agents with high values of the rent always improve their position (as they experience no externalities from rivals) whereas for lower value agents it is ambiguous and depends on the relative globalness of the consumption e¤ect, the bargaining power of the agents and the asymmetry in agents' valuation of the rent. We also show that for su¢ ciently large marginal consumption externalities, Pigouvian taxation in which tax revenues are transferred to the agent with the lowest value may be a desirable mechanism due to Pareto improvements. In particular, e¤orts are maintained at conventional Pigouvian levels while the payo¤ for the low value agent is larger than under Coasean bargaining.
Our work thus contributes to the growing literature on contests by exploring how the degree of relative 'globalness'of consumption externalities interact with conventional contest externalities in a simple framework. This allows us to analyse the incentive to invest in e¤ort to obtain resources that produce externalities of varying degrees of 'globalness'.
Allowing externalities to be created as a result of consumption provides an additional method to consider contests. This may highlight important issues in rent seeking for natural resources, con ‡ict, patent races and so on, where the consumption of the prize appears to have important implications for agents' incentives to invest e¤ort. Further, important policy implications occur due to the implementation of Pigouvian taxation or Coasean bargaining prior to the contest. These results can be directly applied to contests over natural resources. Pigouvian taxes (pollution taxes) and Coasean bargaining (tradable permit markets) are now commonly experienced in environmental regulation (Freeman and Kolstad, 2007) . This paper adds to the literature on the desirability of Pigouvian taxes or Coasean bargaining for the control of resources by providing evidence of signi…cant di¤erences in incentives under both regulatory mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out the model when consumption externalities exist. Section 3 introduces Pigouvian taxes and Coasean bargaining and shows the changes to equilibrium e¤ort and payo¤s and Section 4 has some concluding remarks.
The model
Consider a set of agents = f1; 2; :::; ng that participate in a complete information contest by investing in e¤ort s i 8i 2 in order to win a share of a rent at a sunk linear cost. The contestable rent A 2 R + is rivalrous, excludable and common knowledge to all agents. However, the rent may produce consumption e¤ects. That is, the consumption of the rent may produce local private bene…ts as well as 'global'externalities on rival agents.
To represent agent i's share of the rent, we de…ne a share function for agent i given by a conventional Tullock (1980) contest: 4
where i = f1; : : : ; i 1; i + 1; : : : ; ng.
In order to provide insight into the behaviour of agents in the presence of consumption externalities, we separate the net bene…t of obtaining the rent into attainment bene…ts and consumption bene…ts (damages). For the attainment bene…ts, agent i obtains bene…ts from winning the share of the prize which we represent by L i and is determined by (1). The attainment bene…t is determined solely by agent i's share of the rent and is independent of the consumption of the rent. This bene…t is the value placed on an agent's successful attainment (share) of the rent, for example, this could represent the value of a patent in a R&D contest, the value of natural resources won in a rent seeking game, the value of a wage in a job promotion contest, and so on.
Additional bene…ts (or costs) may occur due to the consumption of the rent. Firstly, agent i's utilisation of the rent may produce "global" externalities that a¤ect rivals. For example, this could include the consumption of resource rights (i.e. pollution damage) or the utilisation of patents which produce positive externalities in terms of technological spillovers. We denote global externalities (borne by agent i) as L i where L i is the share of the prize obtained by rivals and > 0 is a parameter signalling the extent of consumption externalities, that is, the extent of 'globalness'of consumption externalities, where a larger represents more 'global' externalities (in the absolute sense). Second, when agent i consumes a portion of the rent, it may experience alterations to its own private bene…t L i . For example, for negative externalities, one can consider the reduction in its own bene…t due to the pollution created. Throughout the paper, we refer to these e¤ects as private consumption bene…ts and denote this by L i where L i is the share won by agent i in the contest and > 0 is a parameter denoting the extent of private consumption bene…ts. This e¤ect is rivalrous and excludable with the capturing of the rent. Throughout we assume full utilisation of the rent by agents. 5 Therefore, agent i's aggregate in ‡uence from rent utilisation is given by the summation of global externalities and private consumption bene…ts a¤ected by consumption given by:
5 Introducing a second stage where the agent has the option to only utilise a proportion of the rent that is won i 2 [0; 1], so that local consumption externalities of the equilibrium rent are given by i !vL i will result in corner solutions for costless consumption. In particular, for negative (positive) local externalities the agent decides to consume none (all) of the rent.
where ! indicates whether externalities are positive (! > 0) or negative (! < 0).
Equilibrium strategy
To demonstrate how contests with consumption externalities di¤er from conventional contests, one can compare equilibrium rent seeking e¤orts. To do this, let us denote a benchmark model where no consumption externalities exist (E i = 0) and denote the benchmark rent seeking e¤ort by s B i . The following proposition provides a comparison of symmetric equilibrium e¤ort s i = s i = s from a contest with externalities and the benchmark model.
To the extent that e¤ort is larger than the benchmark depends on whether consumption externalities are either positive (! > 0) or negative (! < 0) and the relative marginal globalness of this e¤ect, that is, the absolute di¤erence in .
Consider positive consumption externalities ! > 0, where global externalities may be formed due to rivals'consumption of the rent ( ) and private consumption bene…ts are also realized ( ). If > then the marginal bene…t from private consumption bene…ts is larger than the marginal bene…t from global positive externalities. Therefore, an incentive exists for agent i to increase e¤ort. It follows that even in the presence of positive consumption externalities, e¤ort will be larger than the benchmark model. However, when < the marginal bene…ts from local consumption externalities are smaller than those from global externalities. Here we observe the incentive to free ride, as the bene…ts due to rivals' consumption produce larger bene…ts to agent i than her own bene…ts from the private consumption bene…ts.
Similar logic applies to negative consumption externalities ! < 0, in that if < , rivals' marginal (negative) consumption externalities are relatively large compared to the marginal damages from the private consumption bene…ts experienced by agent i's consumption, hence, agent i decides to increase e¤ort in order to reduce the relative increase in negative externalities produced by rivals (Shogren and Crocker, 1991) . Finally when > , the marginal damage from private consumption bene…ts is larger than the marginal damage from the global negative externalities so agent i chooses to reduce rent seeking.
In the existing literature, Shogren and Crocker (1991) are able to show that over-e¤ort occurs for negative transferable externalities (and a decrease in e¤ort caused by …lterable externalities). Here, Proposition 1 provides deeper insight for the results of Shogren and Crocker (1991) in that we …nd relative global negative externalities tend to produce over e¤ort in contests. Yet we …nd additional cases where private consumption bene…ts can alter these results. Proposition 1 shows that it is the relative size of local bene…ts (costs) and global externalities (and not simply the existence of externalities) that determines whether an agent over (or under) invests in e¤ort. This is important when we begin to consider the utilisation of resources. For example, the consumption of natural resources has the potential to produce both private consumption damages and global negative externalities and therefore it depends on the relative size of these externalities as to whether agents will over-(under-) invest in e¤ort. 6
It is clear from Proposition 1 that even in the presence of private consumption ben-e…ts (damages) and global externalities, e¤ort may not di¤er from the benchmark level (however the payo¤s will be di¤erent). When = , the marginal private bene…ts (costs) are equal to the marginal gain (cost) from the global positive (negative) externalities. For example, this may be applicable to contests over carbon dioxide rights. Carbon dioxide is 6 An equivalent analysis can also consider group contests. Additional consumption externalities arise from the consumption of the remaining members in group i.
This we denote as
where a 2 [0; 1] is an exogenous parameter which describes the characteristics of the sharing rule within group i (Nitzan, 1991) and is a parameter denoting the level of intra-group externalities. When a = 0, the share to each agent is based on agent k's e¤ort relative to all other group i members s ik Si . When a = 1, the prize won by group i is shared equally among all members. We …nd that for v = 0 that @S @ ? 0 if and only if a 7 1=n . When a ! 1 (and hence a > 1=n) the sharing rule tends in favour of equal distribution which is independent of agents'e¤ort. Therefore, given an increase in fellow group members' consumption externalities, an incentive exists to reduce e¤ort in order to reduce the exposure of externalities by reducing the share of the group's winning share. This is a perverse incentive in that the agent, in order to reduce exposure from fellow group members'externalities, would rather lower their team share of the prize in the group contest. This is a direct consequence of not being able to transfer externalities by investing in e¤ort (and hence consumption) as a ! 1. When e¤ort (and hence consumption) can transfer externalities, that is, when a ! 0 (a < 1=n), then an increase in group members'consumption externalities results in an incentive to increase e¤ort in order to not only crowd out rivals, but also to crowd out fellow group members from consuming the prize. a 'pure'transboundary pollutant where the (marginal) damages caused by the utilisation of the rights are independent of the geographical area in which they are produced ( = ).
Therefore, this contest may produce e¤ort levels similar to a contest with no consumption externalities. In these cases, both e¤ects types perfectly counterbalance each other. Like many rents, the e¤ects of consumption may persist throughout time. It is easy to illustrate the augmented e¤ect of persistent externalities. 7 To represent this, we allow consumption externalities to persist throughout (in…nite) time and 'decay'at a rate in each year (from the initial consumption) with a discount factor = 1 1+r ; where r > 0 is the discount rate. Therefore, present value consumption externalities are given by:
]. When = 0 consumption externalities are simply the value in the present period whereas when = 1 we have inde…nite consumption externalities (which is discounted throughout time). The varying levels of persistence can be seen by focusing on resource rights where the levels of decay can vary dramatically from a few weeks (such as methane emissions) to hundreds of years (such as radioactive material).
An increase in persistence will increase the distortion in equilibrium rent seeking e¤ort.
When marginal consumption externalities are positive and the e¤ect is relatively 'local' then agent i will increase rent seeking e¤ort. Therefore, as persistence increases, this augments the marginal bene…t to agent i so that rent seeking e¤ort is increased.
Asymmetric valuations
For tractability, let us assume a contest consists of two participating agents k = L; H which have asymmetric values of the rent. In particular, agents L and H have values of the rent A L and A H respectively, where, without loss of generality, we assume that A L < A H so that agent H has a larger valuation of the rent than agent L.
We focus, for the rest of the paper, on negative consumption externalities and nor-7 Here we assume that consumption of the prize is a 'one-o¤'event and in future periods only decaying consumption externalities are experienced. Therefore the strategic decisions are static. It is also possible to introduce a dynamic game in that we have repeated consumption with a stock of externalities being in ‡uenced by the historical levels of externalities and current period consumption. For dynamic and repeated contests see Cairns (1989) , Leininger and Yang (1994) , Wirl (1994) and Sha¤er and Shogren (2008) malise the size of externalities to ! = 1 and the private consumption bene…t (damage) so that v = 0. It is also possible to consider positive consumption externalities of varying degrees. Each agent experiences a level of negative externalities equal to the consumption of the opponent's share of the rent. Formally, agents'payo¤ functions are given by:
From (3) and (4), each agent obtains the rent equal to their investment in e¤ort relative to total e¤ort with the addition of negative externalities from rivals'consumptions.
Di¤erentiating (3) and (4) with respect to s L and s H respectively and solving for optimal values of e¤ort s L and s H yields: 8
The corresponding equilibrium payo¤s for agent k is:
From (5), equilibrium e¤ort is distorted up due to negative externalities whilst payo¤s are distorted downwards compared to the case without consumption externalities. As shown in Proposition 1, as marginal negative externalities increase, equilibrium e¤ort also increases, to crowd out the rivals and reduce negative consumption externalities.
Note that (5) and (6) can be rewritten so thatÂ L = (1 + )A L and similarly for agent H. It follows that for valuations Â L ;Â H the analysis has similarities to conventional asymmetric valuation contests (Nti, 1999) . In particular, the valuation ratio is identical,
8 The second order conditions are satis…ed at the optimal values of rent-seeking.
We now show how agents'rent seeking e¤orts and payo¤s change given alternative regulatory mechanisms to control externalities.
3 Equilibrium e¤ort and payo¤s under the establishment of Pigouvian taxation and Coasean bargain- 
As it is well known how Pigouvian taxation and Coasean bargaining are optimally chosen in a regulatory system (See, for example, Bamoul and Oates, 1988), we instead focus on the consequence for equilibrium rent seeking and payo¤s given these mechanisms are chosen optimally by the regulator.
In particular, it is clear that, given complete certainty in the bene…ts and costs of the production of externalities, the use of price (Pigouvian taxes) and quantity (Coasean bargaining) mechanisms should yield the same result (Weitzman, 1974) . In our context, this means from the viewpoint of expected costs, allowing a rent to be ex post reallocated will result in the same outcome as if a tax per unit of externality is levied. However, an open question arises with respect to whether Pigouvian taxes or Coasean bargaining is the preferred regulatory mechanism when the resources are allocated through a contest.
In particular, how do Pigouvian taxation and Coasean ex post reallocation responses to consumption externalities di¤er in their in ‡uence on socially wasteful rent seeking e¤ort and agents'payo¤s?
Pigouvian taxation
The …rst approach to controlling externalities is the introduction of a tax based on consumption and hence the transfer of externalities. In this context, an agent that wins a share of the rent must also pay the unit tax applicable to the damage caused by their consumption externalities. 9 For the tax rate based on the level of consumption externalities produced by agent L and H, their payo¤s become:
which is solved for (s P L ; s P H ).
From (8), agent L 's tax burden is equal to the amount of externalities produced by its consumption s L s L +s H A L and similarly for agent H. As the marginal rate of externalities are assumed to be identical for both agents (the marginal increase in agents'share of the rent is equal to ), one simply needs to levy a common tax rate L = = H . 10 9 Here, the tax is based on the share of the rent consumed by each player. Other possible taxes exist which may include taxation of realised pro…ts or rent-seeking expenditures (Glazer and Konrad, 1999; Katz and Rosenberg, 2000; Epstein and Nitzan, 2002) . 10 It is also possible to have asymmetric tax rates based on the heterogeneous distribution of the externality. For example, this occurs in many pollution problems that have non-uniform transboundary spillover rates, such as the case for SO 2 emissions in the United States (Ellerman et al., 2000) .
Coasean bargaining
An alternative solution is to allow the rent to be reallocated among the agents ex post. 11
The clearest example of such a process is the recent introduction of tradable pollution permit markets where …rms through the (partial) process of rent seeking obtain an initial allocation of permits and are allowed to ex post trade (Hanley and MacKenzie, 2009 ).
We follow a framework similar to Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2009) but allow the market price of the rent to be determined by the bargaining power of both agents and independent of shares won in the contest. Formally, the price is determined by
where is the bargaining power of agent H and A L < < A H . 12 From (10), an increase in the bargaining power of the high valuing agent (agent H) results in the market price of the rent decreasing. This determines a common value of the rent, which as we will see below, has important implications for e¤ort strategies.
Given an ex post reallocation of the rent is possible, it is e¢ cient to allow low value agents to sell their share of the rent to high value agents. As agent L is the lowest value agent, any share of the rent won on the contest is sold to agent H at the price determined in (10). This price is at least as big as agent L's valuation of the rent. Therefore, agent L sells all rent won in the contest to agent H and obtains the revenue s L s L +s H but experiences all consumption externalities A L . Formally, agent L's payo¤ function is:
which is optimally solved for s C L .
For agent H, additional to the share of rent won in the contest s H s L +s H A H , it has the opportunity to purchase the remaining rent at a price that is lower that its own 11 Ex post reallocation (resale) has been extensively discussed by Gupta and Lebrun (1999) , Zheng (2002) , Haile (2003) , Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2009) , Garratt and Tröger (2006) , Hafalir and Krishna (2008) and Sui (2009). 12 In order for tractability, we assume exogenous bargaining however there are other possibilities. Most bargain problems proceed with exogenous bargaining power, such as the Nash bargaining program. valuation. Therefore the additional bene…t obtained due to Coasean bargaining is given as s L s L +s H (A H ). As agent H now consumes the entire rent after ex post reallocation, it no longer experiences any negative externalities from the rival. Formally, agent H 's payo¤ function is denoted by:
which is optimally solved for s C H .
Comparison of Pigouvian and Coasean solutions 3.4.1 Equilibrium strategies
As shown in Appendix B, the equilibrium e¤ort levels for both policy mechanisms are now independent of marginal consumption externalities:
By comparing the equilibrium solutions obtained from (5) Interesting results occur when one considers e¤ort of Coasean bargaining compared to a contest with uncontrolled externalities (s k ). Allowing for an additional regulatory mechanism to control for externalities may, in some cases, actually increase the equilibrium level of socially unproductive e¤ort. The following corollary provides a comparison of the e¤ort of agents.
Corollary 1 For rents that produce consumption externalities, allowing Coasean bargaining may either increase or decrease rent seeking for both agents relative to the case with uncontrolled externalities ( s C k ? s k for k = L; H).
Proof. See Appendix B.
A counter-intuitive result from Corollary 1 shows that allowing Coasean bargaining may actually increase the total socially unproductive e¤ort. In the existing literature, can occur for two main reasons. From (10), the market value of the rent is determined by both the bargaining power of agents ( ) and their valuations. Therefore, both agents increase e¤ort when either is low (the low value agent has improved bargaining power)
or when agent H's valuation increases (i.e. a low ). Given a reduction in the level of , agent H now has to pay relatively more for agent L's share of the rent, hence there is an incentive for agent H to increase e¤ort to avoid paying the additional price. Similarly, as agent L has a better bargaining position it has an incentive to increase e¤ort to obtain a larger share of the rent to sell to agent H. Similar logic applies for an increase in the value agent H places on the prize. From (13), it can be seen that aggregate rent seeking e¤ort from Pigouvian and Coasean solutions are equal F C = F P when the su¢ cient condition is met: F 1 1+ . This shows that the value of bargaining power where F C = F P is given by the range [ 1 2 ; 1]. As shown above, we can observe that Pigouvian taxation produces the lowest aggregate rent seeking when 0 < F , that is, when agent H has low bargaining power.
Indeed, Pigouvian taxation always results in lower aggregate e¤ort when agent L has the majority of the bargaining power, that is, 0 < 1 2 . However, when we compare aggregate e¤orts under Coasean bargaining to aggregate e¤orts in the contest with uncontrolled externalities, we see that the degree of globalness does have a role to play. From (14), an increase in the degree of globalness places downward pressure on the aggregate e¤orts of Coasean policies, thus making it more likely to be smaller than aggregate e¤orts from a contest with uncontrolled externalities. It is clear that, given F C < F P , we must also have F C < F . However, when F C > F P , the degree of globalness will determine whether F C > F or F C < F .
Equilibrium payo¤s
Let us now turn to the comparison of equilibrium payo¤s for both agents. The next corollary provides a comparison of payo¤s. Corollary 2 shows that for both agents, the introduction of a Pigouvian tax produces the lowest possible payo¤ from the contest. In particular, it can be seen that Coasean bargaining tends to produce larger payo¤s for both agents than Pigouvian taxation. Our results show that the ranking for agent H is clear: Coasean bargaining produces the largest payo¤s. Agent H has the ability to purchase additional shares of the rent on the market at a price lower than agent H's value. As a consequence, agent H consumes the entire rent and experiences no negative externalities (which is borne solely by agent L).
Indeed, this is the reason why Coasean bargaining for agent L may produce an ambiguous payo¤ ranking compared to the benchmark and uncontrolled externalities models. The payo¤ ranking for agent L crucially depends on the relative globalness of externalities . We …nd for a large , agent L will obtain a lower payo¤ compared to the benchmark model and when externalities are uncontrolled.
Pigouvian taxation with lump-sum transfers
Up to this point, we have not discussed what happens to the Pigouvian tax revenue. In this setting, it is possible for the regulator to redistribute tax revenues to the participating agents. To begin, notice that, in terms of agents'rent valuations, aggregate tax revenue is given by:
Using this tax revenue, It is possible to show that Pareto improvements do exist, compared to conventional Pigouvian taxation. In particular, Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 3 shows that transferring all tax revenue to the agent with the lowest value produces a Pareto improvement. As the revenue is distributed lump-sum, rent seeking e¤orts are still maintained at their conventional Pigouvian levels. Further, the payo¤ for agent L is at least as large as the payo¤ obtained from the benchmark model (with no consumption externalities). Notice that this occurs with the lowest amount of tax revenue distributed to agent L ( A L ). 14 Importantly, transferring the tax revenue to agent H, even the largest possible amount A H , cannot increase payo¤s above the benchmark or Coasean solutions. One issue with Coasean bargaining is that agent L will experience all consumption externalities and as a consequence, their payo¤ is low. However, given
Pigouvian taxation with revenue recycling and where consumptions externalities are suf-…ciently large ( T ), it follows that agent L's payo¤ is larger than under Coasean bargaining.
Conclusions
Many situations that involve expending e¤ort for common contestable rents are a¤ected by the consumption of the rent. Given this, it is important to understand how equilibrium e¤ort changes when consumption externalities exists and how alternative policies to control externalities a¤ect e¤ort levels and payo¤s. Unlike standard contest problems, the utilisation of the rent can produce local bene…ts (costs) as well as both positive and negative global externalities from rivals'consumption. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to investigate incentives behind e¤ort when the consumption of an excludable and rivalrous rent produces a consumption e¤ect and compare the e¤ects of Pigouvian and Coasean regulatory mechanisms.
Our simple model allows agents to rent seek over a common contestable rent which has the potential to produce consumption externalities. These consumption externalities are 14 Improvements in agents'payo¤s can be seen more clearly when we assume symmetric agents. In such a cases, the revenue transfer is A. It is easy to show that a Pareto improvement exists between the contest with consumption externalities and a contest with revenue neutral Pigouvian taxation for any tax revenue transfer. Further, aggregate payo¤s also increase with respect to the benchmark contest without consumption externalities given the transfer belongs to the set where for transfers
in addition to those experienced in conventional contests. We …nd that in the equilibrium of the contest, agents'optimal actions decrease in the index of relative globalness. The intuition for this result is as follows. For positive consumption externalities, agents have an incentive to decrease e¤ort when relative globalness increases as the agent can free ride. Considering negative consumption externalities, an increase in globalness results in an incentive to increase e¤ort in order to crowd out rivals'allocation of the rent, reduce rivals'share of consumption and hence negative externalities that they produce. Allowing additional polices to control externalities, namely Pigouvian taxation and Coasean bargaining, alters the amount invested in e¤ort. In particular, Pigouvian taxation tend to lower the amount of resources used where this may not always happen under Coasean bargaining.
Considering the …ndings in this paper, it is important for governments and policymakers to understand when, and to what extent, e¤ort plays an important role in determining the composition of the contestable rent. To this end, regulators need to carefully consider the size of the rent and the characteristics of consumption externalities before initiating regulation. In particular, for many policy considerations, Pigouvian taxation coupled with some element of lump-sum transfer may reduce costly rent seeking e¤ort and improve the welfare of some agents compared to other approaches. Future work may focus on intertemporal aspects of consumption externalities where the utilisation of the prize and the subsequent exposure to externalities may happen in multiple time periods and where externalities persist throughout time. Further studies may focus on the informational settings within this model and introduce asymmetric information among agents.
For the conventional Tullock (1980) contest the symmetric Nash equilibrium is:
comparison of the two rent seeking strategies yields the result.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. We start by solving the Pigouvian tax and Coasean bargaining payo¤ functions.
For a Pigouvian tax, di¤erentiating (8) and (9) with respect to s L and s H respectively, yields:
equating each to zero and solving, we obtain the e¤ort strategies for agents L and H respectively:
The optimal Pigouvian tax holds when = which reduces the equilibrium e¤ort strategies to:
where A L AH 2 (0; 1) and k = L; H. Let us now consider e¤ort in the presence of Coasean bargaining. Di¤erentiating (11) and (12) 
Appendix C
Proof of Corollary 2:
Proof. Using the equilibrium e¤ort strategies found in the proof of Proposition 2 and substituting into the payo¤ functions yields the following: For C L and B L it is also ambiguous:
( Proof. To compare P N L B k this can be rewritten as:
where R L is the lump-sum transfer to agent L. This is reduced to:
From expression 15 we know that R L A L . Therefore it holds that A L + R L 0.
Next, let us compare P N L C L which is:
and this means that P N L C L when for > T where T is given by: T = (1 ) + 1 4
( 1 + ) 2
